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REVIEW ARTICLE
Science, (jf Society, Vol. 73, No. 3, July 2009, 40.S-410
THE UNITED AUTO WORKERS UNION
AS AMERICAN VANGUARD, 1935 TO 1970:
OR ILLUSION?*
From 1935 tiirougii tiie eariy 21stcentui7, tiie United Auto Workers (UAW)
has enjoyed a widespread reptitation as a progressive tinion witii an explic-
itiy ieft-wing politics (Lichtenstein, 1995). Few can dispute tiie UAW's overtly
left-wing nature during the union's first dozen tumtiituous years, when
assorted ieft-wing activists, sticii as tiie iarger and more infltiential Com-
munists and smalier groups sticii as tiie Lovestoneites, Trotskyists, Shacht-
manites, and Oehierites as well as independent socialists (Doiiinger and
Doiiinger, 2000), contributed to a vibrant internai democracy and militancy
expressed ijoth at the union hail and on the siiop floor. Even in tiie late
1970s with the UAW's key roie in the organizing of the Progressive Aiiiance
(Battista, 1991), variotis segments of the left latided the union in attempt-
ing to unite labor, environmental and community grotips in its pursuit of
an explicitly liberal agenda prior to the onset of the Reagan era.
The book reviewed in this essay adopts the position that the UAW, and
its long-time leader Waiter Reuther, were among the main progenitors of a
distinctiy American version of social democracy, if not indeed its sole archi-
tects. While not denying some of tiie union's significant collective bargain-
ing victories, obtained from some of the world's largest and most powerftil
atito mantifacttirers, combined with its commitment to developing a social
democratic polity in the United States, I maintain that Reuther and the UAW
* AmericiDi Vanguard: The United Aitla Workers During tin: lieuther Years, 1935-1970, by |ol\n
Bariiaid. Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press. 2004. $44.95; paper. S29.9.">.
Pp. 608.
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also must be evaltiated on other criteria stich as the internal regime con-
sciotisly constructed in ptirsuit of the tmion's goals.
I will argue that the UAW does not desen'e such an accolade. Although
the auto union may have obtained tmrivaled wages and benefits — a point
however disputed by Freeman (2004, 761) — and while it attained some-
thing akin to guaranteed job sectirity for its membership, when one exam-
ines the UAW's level of internal democracy, the involvement of rank-and-file
workers, combined with the union's positions on racial eqtiality; there were
unions that were far superior to the UAW during the Reuther era. One might
even contend that anointing any union as "American vanguard" is poiht-
less, given the state of U. S. workers' trade ttnion consciotisness and class
consciousness in this period. While this viewpoint has merit, to the extent
any union can be singled out for a "vanguard" role, there are others that
are, arguably, more worthy of this honor.
Given the alternatives in the American Federation of Labor-Congress
of Indtistrial Organizations after the 1955 merger, the UAW did look very
much like the most uniquely democratic and successful union in the Uniiled
States, a position celebrated by Barnard. In order to effectively evaltiate
Barnard's thesis, however, we need to examine the "real existing" alterna-
tives to the UAW, specifically the United Electrical Workers Union (UE)'
and the Farm Eqtiipment Workers Union (FE) .'^ These two CPUSA-led tinións
were vastly superior to the UAW with respect to organizational democracy,
rank-and-file involvement, contractual patterns, shop-floor activity, and dhe
strtiggle for racial equality. I
One might argtie that it is tinfair to compare the UAW to these two
tinions, given that the FE ceased to sumve past 1955 and the UE was re-
duced to a shell of its former self, with a greatly reduced membership. How-
ever, in evaluating the auto union's history, it is important to note that
the UAW and the Reutherites were instrumental in the FE's destruction
(Devinatz, 2008). Moreover, the UE was every bit as democratic and mili-
tant an industrial union before'iXs exptilsion from the CIO in 1949, as it was
in the years after.
American Vanguard is a largely sympathetic accotint of the first 35 years of
Reuther and the auto union's histoiy. In the "Acknowledgements," Barnard
states that former UAW vice president Irving Bluestone and two former UAW
1 At its zenith in 1947, the LIE held eollective bargaining righLs for 600,000 workers. Aller
the LIE left the CIO, by 19.56, more than half a decade of raids by the International Union
of Electrical Workers, its anticommunisl rival, resulted in a decrease iti the UE's mem-
bership to 7.5,000. For an excellent histoi') of the UE, see Filippeli and McColloch, 1995.
2 Although there is a relative paucity of research on the FE, good information on the union
can be found in Devinatz, 2008 and Gilpin, 1992. In late 1949, the FE joined the UE, for-
mally becoming the FE-UE. '
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presidents, Leonard Woodcock and Dotiglas Fraser, encouraged him to
undertake this study and that Owen Bieber, the UAW president when his
research commenced, provided "an unrestricted grant" (xiii) over the four-
year project.
Although the atithor neither uses any new data sources nor advances
any original interpretations concerning specific events in the UAW, the book
integrates previously known information to provide the most comprehen-
sive treatment of the union's first 35 years that has appeared in print to date.
We should read Barnard to understand the history of the auto union from
1935 to 1970, as told from the Administration Caucus' viewpoint. Although
one learns much about the UAW from Barnard, it is far from a complete his-
tory, because it fails to provide information contrary to the Administration
Caucus' ideology.
The volume begins with a disctission of the societal, economic and
working conditions inside the factories that confronted auto workers prior
to the UAW organizing campaigns in the mid-to-late 1930s, which were
encouraged by the passage of the landmark National Labor Relations Act
in 1935. Clearly a pivotal event for membership growth in the nascent UAW
was the General Motors (GM) Flint sit-down strike of 1956-1937, which
Barnard competently covers in a chapter detailing the union's sit-down
strikes in the first two years of its existence. Although CPUSA unionists played
a key and decisive leadership role in this strike (Keeran, 1980; see 148-185,
especially 183-184; Fine, 1969, 221-223), the author is far from objective
when he minimizes the Party's involvement in this one sentence: "A segment
of the strike's activists and leaders had ties, close or casual, to radical politi-
cal movements, tendencies or parties, whether Communist, Socialist or in-
dependent" (92).
Barnard ably navigates through the turbulent politics of the union's
two factions in the late 1930s, providing details on President Homer Martin's
Progressive Caucus and the Unity Caucus, composed of Communists and
Socialists. He capably disctisses the union split in March 1939 between the
UAW-AFL and the UAW-CIO and the UAW-CIO's reestablishment in a
majority of GM plants after the successful 1939 Tool and Diemakers' Strike.
Upon this victory. National Labor Relations Board certification elections
were conducted; these resulted in the UAW-CIO obtaining exclusive bar-
gaining rights in most of the other major atito company plants.
Barnard describes the importance of the World War II years for the growth
and stabilization of the union with large numbers of African-American and
women workers entering the auto workforce. Union democracy remained
healthy, with factional politics centering on key issues stich as the no-strike
pledge and incentive pay. Shop floor democracy also was alive and well, as
indicated by the thousands of wildcat strikes held between 1943 and 1945
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over wages, job reclassifications, production standards, seniority, job transfer
rights, promotions and safety issues.'^  Other unauthorized work stoppages,
known as "hate strikes," however, occurred when white workers conducted
wildcat strikes in response to the occupational upgrading of African-American
workers with the most serious taking place at Packard in June 1943.
Upon achieving a razor-thin victory in the 1946 elections and obtain-
ing control of the union's Exectitive Board in the 1947 vote, Rettther moved
quickly to ptirge the union leadership of Communists and Communist sym-
pathizers. One could plausibly argue that UAW members' withdrawal! of
support for Communist leadership was dtte to the CPUSA's backing of the
no-strike pledge and incentive pay during World War II to ensure the Soviet
Union's continued existence. Perhaps if the Communists had successfully
clarified the importance of prosecuting the war against fascism on a world
scale and the Soviet Union's survival for the world's progressive forces as
representing U. S. workers' general class interest, in contradistinction to
their short-term gains, this might not have occurred. This explanation,
however, ignores Retither's vicious, but successful, red-baiting tactics in
1946 and 1947.
With the Communists' defeat, Reuther sotight to eliminate smaller feft-
wing groups from the union, such as the Trotskyists (DoUinger and Dollinger,
2000, 108), in order to obtain absolute control of the rank-and-file. Tlins,
from 1947 through 1970, Reuther's UAW was tighdy controlled by his ovm
Administration Caucus, which discotnaged any form of independent rahk-
and-file activity, as well as any ideas contrary to those of the Reutherites.
Furthermore, given the overall balance of cfass forces, tfie UAW's ability to
objectively advance tbe working class' position through the attainment of
variotis welfare-state meastu es depended on the Reutherites' willingness to
establish their legitimacy by expelling the left. And Reuther's purge in the
UAW set the stage for the expulsion of the 11 CPUSA-led unions from the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1949-1950 and the subse-
quent AFL-CIO merger.
Clearfy what impresses Barnard most concerning Reuther is the "priva-
tized welfare state," to tise Nelson Lichtenstein's words, that the auto union
leader constructed from 1948 to 1960 for the UAW membership: an aijray
of collective bargaining achievements, which he sought to extend to other
unionized and nonunion workers alike. These gains included increased
wages, cost-of-living adjustments, paid holidays and vacations, shift differ-
entials, sick pay, medical, dental, and surgical coverage, life insurance, and
pensions. In 1955, Reuther's innovative bargaining proposal for a gtiarjan-
3 Glabcrman (1980) provides a detailed analysis of the wildcat slrikes confVonling ihe UAW
during the World War II era.
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teed annual wage (GAW) resulted in the pioneering of a "supplemental
unemployment henefits" (SUB) program first negotiated at Ford which was
subsequently extended to GM, Chrysler and other auto and agricultural
implement manufacturers that same year. After a two-mouth strike at Ford
in 1967, SUB pay increased to provide laid-off auto workers with essentially
95% of their take-home pay for as long as 52 weeks, essentially hecoming a
GAW.
In spite of the collective bargaining achievements obtained by the UAW,
were these contracts really as good for the auto workers as Barnard claims?
Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003) discovered that the UE's local contract
provisions were far more "pro-labor" than those of the UAW. For example,
44% of UE contracts did not yield to the demand for management preroga-
tives while this was true of only 29% for the UAW. Only 6% of UE contracts
contained no-strike provisions, compared with 53% for the UAW; 93% of
UE contracts versus 48% for the UAW stated that the shop steward must be
present during a grievance's first step, while time limits on the grievance
procedure were found in 65% of UE contracts compared with 43% for the
UAW. The same pattern existed for national-level contracts negotiated by
the UE and the UAW (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003, 174).
As Barnard points out, beginning with the 1948 elections, Reuther aud
the UAW aligned themselves squarely with the Democratic Party's liberal
wing. With Kennedy's election in 1960, Reuther became an ardeut sttpporter
of the civil rights bill before Congress. Upon Johnson's invitation to submit
proposals for his first State of the Union message, Reuther stiggested the
implementation of various antipoverty programs that would aid disadvan-
taged Americans, such as increased public assistance, more public hotising,
job retraining, health care for the aged, educational programs for deprived
children atid higher levels of social security payments.
Although Reuther was buoyed by Johnson's "Great Society" progtam,
at the same time, he became increasingly disenchanted with the AFL-GIO
and its president George Meauy, feeling that the federation neither pro-
moted social change nor attempted to organize the vast majority of non-
union workers. In 1968, after withdrawing from the AFL-CIO, the UAW
established the Alliance for Labor Action (ALA), with the Teamsters Union.
Designed to revive the U. S. labor movement, this project is emphasized by
Barnard as demonstrating Reuther's vanguard role. In order to inject life
into this new labor combination, Renther offered membership to the Inter-
national Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union, aud to the UE. Both
left-wing unions, however, declined affiliation, still harboring enmity towards
Reuther based on his vicious attacks two decades before (Boyle, 1995, 247).
Perhaps these two unions could have reinvigorated the struggling Alliance,
which had a difficult time gaining sufficient momentum from its start.
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Reuther's death in a smaii plane crash in May 1970 aggravated the problenis,
but the ALA, a top-down affair, had been besieged from its birth and coi-
iapsed in the spring of 1972 (Devinatz, 2006).
Barnard does discuss some of the UAW's limitations under Reuther:
tiie Administration Caucus' controi of the union, the treatment of African-
American workers, and shop-fioor miiitancy. Since formal democracy stili
existed in the union, the iack of a democratic spirit and one-party controi
barely concern Barnard. He does note, however, that whiie the UAW offi-
ciaiiy endorsed racial equaiity, it aiiowed inequaiity within the piants and
faiied to advance African-Americans to union ieadership positions. And
Barnard refuses to ceiebrate shop-floor miiitancy, viewing it instead as a
probiem continuaiiy confronting union leaders. As discussed beiow, the UE
was vastiy superior to the UAW with regards to union democracy, while in
the fight for raciai equaiity and rank-and-fiie invoivement, the FE consistentiy
outshone the UAW.
Aithough ied at the nationai ievei by the CPUSA, a number of major
UE iocais, particuiariy those in the Philadelphia district, were controiled by
anti-Coinmunists. All kinds of views were regularly expressed at UE conven-
tions where the nationai leadership was routinely chaiienged by organized
factions. Specific contract demands and collective bargaining strategies
emanated from various locals and industry conference boards, rather tiian
being imposed by the nationai leadership. The union's negotiating comrhit-
tees were elected and tentative contracts were approved through referendums;
the same procedure was used for conducting and terminating strikes. Once
Reuther aciiieved power in 1947, he, along with his supporters, passed con-
stitutionai amendments that increased executive power and iimited "the basic
rights and iiberties" of members; this move virtuaiiy eiiminated, and iliegiti-
mated, tmion factional debate (Stepan-Norris and Zeitiin, 2003, 172-3).
Moreover, Stepan-Norris and Zeidin (2003, 224-225) argue that ai-
though the UE ieaders favored racial equaiity, the union faiied to make'it a
priority because it was "aiready embroiied in a sharp struggie against elec-
trical employers for pay equity and job protection for women.'"* Neverthe-
less, whiie the UAW aiiowed the presence of segregated iocais, most notabiy
Harvester Locai 988 in Memphis through 1960, this was not true for the FE,
one of the UAW's competitors at Harvester. Forlexampie, even prior to the
union's certification eiection victory injtiiy 1947 at the Harvester Louisviiie
piant, FE Locai 236 sticcessfuiiy compelled Harvester to eliminate the sepa-
rate restrooms for African-American and white workers in the main piant.
After certification, the locai iaunched the struggie to upgrade ail workers
4 Feurer (2006) provides convincing evidence that UE District 8 actively fonghl lor racial
justice for African-Atnerican workers both on and off of the shop floor especially during
the Second World War.
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in the factory, irrespective of race, and attained this objective for the first
time in Louisville's history ("Negro-White Unity Wins!" 1951, 2).
Whereas the UAW under Reuther advocated "the politics of prodtictiv-
ity," the FE endorsed rank-and-file involvement through "the politics of class
conflict," arguing that capital and labor had unalterably conflicting inter-
ests (Gilpin, 1992, 257, 268). For the FE, the contract represented a truce
in the class war, not its termination. Thus, in contrast to the UAW, the FE
perceived that a union's strength should be based on a rank-and-file union-
ism where the collective bargaining agreement would not be deemed the
"workplace rule of law" (Gilpin, 1992, 252-307; 279 for quotation). This
advocacy of a militant shop-floor unionism was articulated in the FE's con-
stant use of both authorized and unauthorized work stoppages throughotit
most of the union's existence. For example, at Harvester between October
1,1945 and October 31,1952, the FE conducted 971 walkouts compared to
185 strikes for the UAW (LMDC, [1953?]).
While the UAW, as did the corruption-riddeti Teamsters Union, ob-
tained major collective bargaining gains for its members, a union shotild
not be lauded as a vanguard merely for such achievements. The UE and the
FE did as well at the bargaining table, promoted a vibrant shop floor union-
ism, were more internally democratic and did much more to establish racial
equality in the workplace than the auto union. Gontra Barnard and Lichten-
stein (1995), it is high time that the myth of the UAW being the American
vanguard of U. S. labor organizations is laid to rest.
VICTOR G. DEVINATZ
Department of Manageynent and Quantitative Methods
Illinois State University
Normal, Ittinois 61790-5580
vgdevin @ihtu. edit
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vCritical Companion to Contemporary Marxism, edited hy Jacques Bidet and
Stathis Kotivelakis. Leiden, Holland:Brill, 2008. $199.00. Pp. xv, 813.
Is Marxism still of interest or is it now dead — its fate sealed by neoliberalism?
The editors of this voltime argue that Marxism persists, is productive and has
the capacity to adapt to context and cultures (xxi). The book is written from
the standpoint of academic commentators who sympathize with Mai-xism itself.
The volume begins with "préfigurations" — the context in which con-
temporaiy Marxism has developed. It then moves on to "configurations" —
looking at the different schools within Marxist theoiy. It concludes with
chapters on key figures.
One of the disappointing feattues of this othenvise ambitiotis and (rela-
tively) comprehensive voltmie is its treatment of the state. Domenico Losurdo
is cited as having confronted "the elements of abstract utopia in Marx as re-
gards the state" (62), btit it is not clear as to whether this is a reference to the
idea that in a classless society the state itself will disappear. Bob Jessop's analysis
of "states, state power and state theoiy" says nothing about the classic thesis
of the withering away of the state — whether it is still valid, and if so, what
is needed to give the argument greater theoretical purchase (449). In my view,
a distinction needs to be made between the state — an instittition that resorts
to force to tackle conflicts of interest — and government as a process of ne-
gotiation and arbitration. Government is inherent in society but the state is
not, and government (or governance as it is sometimes called) relies tipon
moral pressures, and .social and natural constraints to sectu e order. This type
of analysis could make the withe ring-away thesis far more plausible.
The volume argties that the crisis of the neoliberal order has always been
a negative precondition for a revival of Marxism (78) and Gérard Duménil
and Dominique Levy speak prophetically of the hegemony of finance as a
result of the ascendancy of neoliberalism, thus demonstrating the relevance
of a Marxist toolkit (100-101). The book involves a critical interrogation of
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Analytical Marxism, the Frankfurt School, the later Georg Lukács and the
Btidapest School, regulation theoiy and ecological Marxism: the piece on
the latter calls for a "new, universalistic htimanism" (207) which seems to
me absolutely right.
The point ought to be made that the notion of a dialectics of nature —
often viewed with suspicion by "Western Marxists" — can only strengthen
an ecologically sensitive Marxism. The work of Andre Guilder Frank, Samir
Ajnin, Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi is evaluated in a piece
on capitalism as a world system, while the chapter on liberation theology
contains a quote from Dom Helder Cámara: "as long as I was asking people
to help the poor, I was called a saint. But when I asked: why is there so much
poverty? I was treated as a communist" (226). Michael LÖ\N7 has fascinating
comments on the "theological metaphors" to which Mai-x resorts in his analy-
sis of capitalism and commodity fetishism (230). Tony Andreani argues that
many models of market socialism pertain more to a popular capitalism than
to socialism (246). There is commentary on the radical political economists
in the USA, the "political Marxism" of Robert Brenner and Ellen Wood', an
analysis of the British Marxist historians, and one on postcolonial studies
which criticizes mtich of the literature for simply ignoring Marxist analyses
of colonialism and imperialism.
Alex Callinicos refers to gender oppression as a form of non-class domi-
nation (85) and the examination of developments in class analysis takes for
granted what in my view is a rather narrow and abstract view of class. Should
we continue to see class as a factor that exists alongside gender, nationality,
"race," etc.? Why not broaden the notion of class so that the form of class
struggle always involves gender, ethnicity, nationality, etc. in a way that seems
to contradict the class content of stich strtieeles? This view accords well with
work on the "new dialectic" thatjim Kincaid looks at, where the tension
between phenomenal appearance and hidden relationships is stressed (395).
Callinicos comments on Roy Bhaskar's recentdiscoveiy of Eastern reli-
gion, "an astonishing turn" for one who built his reptitation expounding
"critical realism" (584). The volume contains a lively analysis of historical
materialism and international relations, and critiques and expositions of
Theodor Adorno, Alain Badiou, Louis Althusser, Walter Benjamin, Pierre
Bourdieu, and Giles Deletize, who made the extraordinary comment that
"what I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics" (617) .Jacques Derrida
is looked at, as is Michel Foticault, Jürgen Habermas, FredricJameson, and
Henri Lefebvre. Kozo Uno, a Japanese scholar concerned with Capital} re-
ceives attention, as do Antonio Gramsci and the varying interpretations of
his work. It is disappointing that the editors were unable find anyone to write
up the developments of feminist theory and its relationship to Marxism,
while it is surely odd that nothing is said abotit the contribution which this
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jotirnai has made to the deveiopment of Marxism over the years or tiie con-
tribtition to economic theoiy of its editor.
We are told that the Institute of Social Research seeks to civilize the
power of the state and the market, not abolish it (160), and that Jacques
Bidet, one of the editors of the volume, sees it as a utopia that "tiie market
can simpiy be repiaced by organised direction" (9).
But there are two probiems here which exempiify much of the commen-
tary in the voiume. The first is a curiotisiy uncriticai attitude towards the basic
institutions that underiie the contemporar)' worid. t have already referred to
the state, but we need to view the market itself critically. Of course the mar-
ket cannot be abolished (as pianners in the old Eastern Etirope and tiie USSR
seemed to imagine), but it can and must be graduaiiy transcended. By this I
mean a iong-term process of making sociai reiationships increasingly trans-
parent and exchanges between individuals become more concrete, so that
we see reai people and tiie impact on nature when we trade and produce.
Is this Utopian? One of tiie concepts tiiat needs to be criticaiiy interro-
gated — and which is not tackied in tiiis voiume — is preciseiy tiie concept of
Utopia. Do we have to accept the ciassicai Marxist diciiotomy between science
and Utopia? Certainiy tiiere is a traditionai view of utopia as a "perfect" worid,
which ought to be rejected, but I wouid argue that the concept of utopia can
and shotiid be reconstructed as a moment of change — part of an ongoing
process that has no stopping point. Ciassicai Marxism has treated communism
too staticaiiy and abstractiy, so tiiat it becomes easy for opponents of Marx to
ciiaracterize communism as the "end of history," a fantasy or titopia in the
traditional sense of the term. Beiiind the often difficult prose of tiiese essays
iies an unwiiiingness to tackie the probiems of moving towards greater sociai
emancipation, not as a dramatic, one-off event, but a long term process —
the movement of histoiy taking place in front of otu" veiy eyes.
But this is an exciting, if rather highly priced, volume.
JOHN HOFFMAN
Defiartment of Politics (Emeritvs)
University of Leicester
Leicester UÍ1 7RH
United Kingdom
j . a. hoffman®nttiüorld. com
Why Is There No Labor Party in the United Statesfhy Roijin Archer. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007. $35.00. Pp. 368.
By paraphrasing the tide of Werner Sombart's Wliy Is There No Socialism, in
the United States? (1906), Robin Archer, who iieads postgradtiate poiiticai

